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I

n 2002, the U.S. Coast Guard launched an
innovative and highly complex contracting
relationship with a Lockheed Martin and
Northrup Grumman joint venture. The relationship
was designed to overcome the “rigid regulations and
red tape that all too often killed contracts through
a thousand small wounds” (1). By April 2007, after
a firestorm of negative media, whistleblowing, and
impending congressional hearings, the Coast Guard
returned to “buying assets one at a time, scrambling
to hire more contract managers, and relying on a
traditional regulatory and enforcement contracting
approach” (2). The procurement experiment in
innovation, flexibility, and cost-saving failed after just
5 years.
Through this complex contracting case, Brown,
Potoski, and Van Slyke aim to bridge the divide
between academics and practitioners. They draw from
theory and prior research to help explain the events
that transpired in the case without overreliance on
technical terminology. This is more clearly described
below. Their ultimate objective is to provide insights
that will improve the purchasing process for both
buyers and sellers involved in complex products and
services. They accomplish these objectives and several
others through a detailed case study analysis with both
rigor and depth that provides real value to scholars,
students, and practitioners.
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The presentation of the case, and subsequent
analysis, anchors itself to two primary approaches
for contracting. The rule-based approach requires
the government buyer to identify a priori all the
specifications and terms required, while the vendor
simply agrees to meet those terms for payment. The
relationship-based approach allows the buyer and
seller to engage over the long term to meet evolving
mutually beneficial expectations. Exact specifications
and terms are determined over time, together. This
evolution is enhanced by the relationship between
the two that encourages a win-win solution over the
long haul.
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Both approaches have merit and both are deeply
flawed. The relationship approach, stemming from
the New Public Management literature, suggests
the promise—a way forward that transcends
bureaucracy—and overlooks short-sighted, zero-sum
games. This relational approach risks uncertainty and
potentially divergent stakeholder goals early on, in
favor of the longer-term understanding gained through
true partnership. The rule-based approach serves
the conservative baseline by minimizing risk to both
parties. It protects and limits, but provides clarity and
accountability. The authors seek to ultimately combine
the best of these two approaches to serve the interests of
both buyer and seller, especially for complex contracts
where rules are difficult to foresee and relationships will
be strained after the so-called honeymoon.
The authors first present their theoretically grounded
framework for managing complex contracts
(Chapter 2). Chapter 2 is a gem in and of itself, as
it explains, “Our aim in this chapter was to suggest
a way for buyers and sellers to approach complex
contracting, diagnose the grounds for both its winwin and lose-lose potential, and begin to consider
how to better structure the rules and relationships
underlying complex exchanges” (54). They then
introduce us to the Deepwater program (Chapter 3),
setting the tone and background for their analysis
of the complexities of the contracting process that is
focused on rules (Chapter 4), performance incentives
(Chapter 5), and behaviors (Chapter 6), before
plotting a path forward in terms of management
strategies for complex contracts (Chapter 7).
The theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2 sets
the stage for the case, but it also serves as an excellent
graduate level primer on contracting, ideally suited
for courses on public management (e.g., for a week on
contracting). First, the authors differentiate between
simple and complex products. Next, they present
the difficulties with contracts designed for complex
products, such as the Deepwater project. Positioning
contracts as sets of rules, they differentiate between

product rules and exchange rules. Then, the authors
discuss the challenges of incomplete contracts, which
motivate the need for a relational understanding of
contracts, where they rely on game theory and the
classic prisoners’ dilemma. By distinguishing between
rule-based and relationship-based approaches to
solving complex contracting dilemmas, the authors
explore Ostrom’s common pool resources, Williamson’s
social interactions governance, and Axelrod’s tit-for-tat
strategies, among others in a survey of the governance
landscape. The problem’s “lock-ins” and uncertainty
create a rule-based approach that implies the need for
collective action solutions, fraught with well-illustrated
relational concerns. The necessary conditions for
this desired behavior require buyers and sellers to
be engaged in repeated interactions, information
symmetry about goals and behaviors, and alignment
between parties regarding the future and reputational
effects. Rules rarely encourage such things.
After establishing the theoretical framework, Brown,
Potoski, and Van Slyke (2003) describe the Coast
Guard’s need to upgrade its fleet of air and sea vessels.
They begin with an overview of the history of the
Coast Guard and the myriad activities and functions
with which it is tasked: defense readiness, migrant
and drug interdiction, aids to navigation, search and
rescue, enforcement of fishing laws and marine safety,
environmental protection and other law enforcement
activities. For much of their history, the agency was
spread thin, earning it a reputation for thrift while
maintaining high performance levels. Eventually,
however, low-cost “just in time” repairs were not
sufficient to address underlying structural problems
with their equipment.
The Deepwater program represented a big picture
solution to the Coast Guard’s decaying fleet and the
problems inherent in the traditional procurement
process. Operating under the Clinton White House,
a central tenet of the Deepwater plan was to bundle
purchases into single, large contracting arrangements
to align systems across the Coast Guard’s many
assets and actions. They reinvented the traditional
federal piecemeal procurement process, proposing
instead a lead systems integrator (LSI) to serve as
general contractor responsible for the “system of
systems.” This contractor would design the system,
contract for parts, manage subcontractors, and
assemble product components. The general contractor
selected for the job, Integrated Coast Guard Systems
(ICGS), was a new joint venture of two of the largest
defense contractors in the industry, who would
partner with the Coast Guard under Deepwater.
The rise of public–private partnerships, the wave
of government reinvention in the 1990s, the New
Public Management movement, and the National
Performance Review all supported the Deepwater
procurement conceptualization to eschew the

traditional and wasteful procurement process of oneoff purchases, which were in favor of the “system of
systems” approach of bundling various asset needs into
one complex “product” with many varied components
deliverable over a much longer time frame.
This new approach promised to lower contract
management costs, increase efficiencies and economies
of scale and scope, and focus both buyer and seller on
systems integration to improve mission achievement.
Unfortunately, they moved a bit too far and too quickly
from the safe, rule-based approach to the complex
relational approach in the midst of many other moving
parts. They moved from procurement of many simple
products, employing simple contracts with many sellers,
to one massive complex product, requiring a similarly
complex contract, with a single seller relying on the
promise of a long-term mutually beneficial relationship.
Measuring success of the program, the contract and the
relationships proved difficult; they needed rules.
The next three chapters represent the heart of this
study. They vividly illustrate the role that rules,
performance incentives, and organizational behaviors
play in complex contracting. The savings envisioned
by the systems of systems gave way to organizational
realities, politics, and confusion. The authors detail the
three-tiered contracting process from the overarching
Indefinite Quantity Contract, to the agency task orders
and the integrated project teams, explaining the logic
and necessity of each. However, the real value of the
chapter lies in the discussion of intersections between
the three. As incomplete rule-based contracts gave way
to the relational approach, competing values, capacity,
mandates, time horizons, cost understandings, and
decision parameters quickly reduced the theoretically
efficient three-tiered rule-based system to a nightmare
of inter- and intra-organizational ineffectiveness.
Performance based incentives proved equally
problematic. First, planning took much longer
than expected, delaying implementation.
Second, performance outputs, measurements,
and awards were never fully articulated. As the
authors highlight, “The most measurable ICGS
outputs from that time were a series of standards
and measurement procedures for the Deepwater
performance award system itself!” (157). Awards
based on ratings of “good” or “marginal” were
ambiguous. Traditionally, the Coast Guard relied
on well-understood outcome measurements to
gauge their success, such as the percentage of lives
saved in search and rescue, or the percentage of
migrants interdicted, but determining whether
improvements in these outcome measures resulted
from Deepwater was nearly impossible. Aligning
incentives, performance, and rewards through rules
proved infeasible across all the varied stakeholders in
the new system of systems.
Book Reviews
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Behavioral solutions fared about as well. One Coast
Guard leader suggested, “I honestly felt, and still think
today, that the best contracts are tied to the healthiest
relationships, where the people have the ability to
be open, honest and trusting” (183). However, in
practice, healthy relationships can be strained when
there is asymmetric information and money at stake.
When asked about performance problems with the
contract, a respondent described a change that ICGS
made at the bequest of the Coast Guard to “save a
nickel.” ICGS made the change, even though they
knew that the change would ultimately lead to worse
outcomes. If ICGS had pushed back, how would
the Coast Guard know that ICGS was “behaving
consummately” rather than “perfunctorily”? They had
not yet developed the win-win shared outlook that the
long-term relational approach promised. They were
stuck in the zero-sum, rule-based approach, despite the
appearance of a long-term relationship. The authors
framed this discussion in terms of three periods, the
honeymoon, the fog, and the divorce, where at first
both parties assumed consummate behaviors, until
doubt set in, and soon skepticism regarding perceived
perfunctory action. The win-win promise of the
honeymoon became the prisoners’ dilemma of divorce.

case into relatively easy-to-grasp, practical lessons
that push back against simplistic notions of
contracting out to save money or reduce political
exposure. At the authors’ own admission, this book
is not a “how to” book. With this caveat in mind,
the book avoids specific actionable prescriptions
for success. Given the depths of understanding
that were clearly demonstrated, one might desire
answers to some questions raised, but the authors
stop short of providing specific steps for effective
complex contracting. What exactly does one need
to understand about complex product procurement?
What rules would serve parties best, and when?
How does one build a relationship that transcends
mistrust? In addition, while the degree of detail
and the depth of players’ voices throughout this
work speak to the thoroughness of the research, the
book lacks a sophisticated discussion of methods.
These two additions would have made this required
reading for doctoral students across many disciplines.
Regardless, it represents a remarkable effort that
reads well, applies theoretically sophisticated
analysis, and tackles a complex and highly relevant
case study in public management in a readily
digestible fashion.

In the final chapter of the book, the authors distill the
lessons learned from the case into three core tenets
that can guide future contract management. First,
both parties must understand the uncertainty and
specialized investment required to deliver and receive
complex products. Second, rules must be well crafted
to promote and reinforce cooperation between the
buyer and seller. Finally, relationships must be built
and developed focused on the future. Doing so can
minimize the opportunity for self-interested behavior
and promote cooperative action.

At the onset of this review, I suggested that the
authors accomplished their goals of bridging the
linguistic divide in contracting, illustrating the
value of academic guidance in contract strategy, and
improving governmental purchasing processes for
complex products and services, and more. This book
also accomplishes the important, though unstated,
goal of reaffirming the value of single case study
research. They leave little doubt that they included
the voice of many key players. The work appears
iterative, evolving as the authors learned more about
the case. It is properly theoretical, punctuated with
vivid, authentic accounts and interpretations by
those most closely involved. Finally, this research
demonstrates the importance and value of bridging
the divide between scholars and practitioners
to produce research with real implications and
important insights.

They offer four practical suggestions to accomplish
this. First, the system of systems concept is not itself
the problem, so they must be cautious not to throw
the baby out with the proverbial bathwater. Second,
the LSI role is also not the problem, she serves a
valuable role, but employing those first two strategies
requires constant and iterative producer and user
input, for which there is no solution other than
seemingly constant communication. In addition, both
parties, despite the LSI role, must maintain their own
internal contract management capacity. Eliminating
such roles is not the place for cost savings.
Furthermore, third-party review and monitoring
(despite the costs associated) can complement that
internal contract management capacity before, during,
and after procurement, and should be utilized.
Taken together, the strengths of this book are its
conceptual clarity and ability to distill a complex
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Ultimately, this book provides a case study in
organizational learning—and the inability of our
government and its contractors to do so at times.
The authors underscore the desire to do so, and
the obstacles that limit success. They map a path
forward, not by prescription, but through a broader
understanding of stakeholder management and shared
strategic direction accomplished through contracts
that display a sufficient understanding of the nature of
complex products so that rules promote cooperative
behavior and build strong healthy interorganizational
relationships—no small task.

